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MORE JUSTICE FOR LESS MONEY*
DAVID FRIEDMAN
Santa Clara University
ABSTRACT

In Cimino v. Raymark, a court resolved 2,298 asbestos cases with 160 trials
by grouping cases, trying a random sample of each group, and awarding all members of each group the average verdict. I propose an improved "I cut, you
choose" version of the procedure designed to correctly allocate damages among
plaintiffs. The plaintiffs' attorney presents a claim for what each plaintiff should
get. The defense selects cases for trial. The average ratio of award to claim for
tried cases is calculated. Each untried case receives that ratio times its claim.
The plaintiffs' attorney will set claims proportional to expected awards in order
to prevent the defense from selecting overclaimed cases for trial and thus driving
down the award for untried cases. Potential problems are examined through a
formal model. Modifications are suggested to adapt the procedure to situations
involving a very large number of small cases.
It is apparent from the effort and time required to try these 160
cases, that unless this plan or some other procedure that permits damages to be adjudicated in the aggregate is approved,
these cases cannot be tried. Defendants complain about the
1% likelihood that the result would be significantly different.
However, plaintiffs are facing a 100% confidence level of being
denied access to the courts. The Court will leave it to the academicians and legal scholars to debate whether our notion of due
process has room for balancing these competing interests.
[JUDGE ROBERT PARKER,

Cimino v. Raymark]

IN Cimino v. Raymark,' Judge Robert Parker of the Eastern District of
Texas implemented a radical solution to the problem of litigating mass
torts. Instead of conducting individual trials for several thousand plaintiffs, he selected a random sample of 160, tried their cases, and based
the awards given to the remaining plaintiffs on the outcome of those
trials. In defending the procedure against the charge that it deprived the
parties of due process, he argued that if he had instead required individual
trials, most of the cases would never have been resolved.
* I would like to thank an anonymous referee and my colleagues at the University of
Chicago and Cornell Law Schools, especially Jonathan Macy, Geoffrey Miller, and Richard
Posner, for many helpful suggestions.
' Claude Cimino et al. v. Raymark Industries, Inc., et al., 751 F.Supp. 649.
[Journal of Law and Economics, vol. XXXIX (April 1996)]
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The procedure of Cimino was explained and defended in a 1992 article
by Michael J. Saks and Peter David Blanck.2 The purpose of this essay
is not to dispute either their views or those of Judge Parker but, rather,
to suggest a further step along the same path. The procedure of aggregation and sampling implemented in Cimino does a reasonably good job of
estimating the total damages that the defendants would have paid if every
case had been tried separately 3 and does so at a cost much lower than
that of individual trials. It does a much poorer job of allocating that total
among the plaintiffs. My proposal is intended to solve that problem.
In Part I of this article I explain the procedure used by Judge Parker
in Cimino, the improvements suggested by Saks and Blanck, and the
limitations of the procedure, even with such improvements. Part II describes my proposal for generating an estimate of the relative claims of
the plaintiffs and incorporating that estimate into the procedure. Part III
considers the legal status of the modified procedure, arguing that it is in
some ways more defensible than the version implemented in Cimino. Part
IV discusses potential problems, both those implicit in the original idea
of aggregation and sampling and additional ones created by my proposed
modifications. Part V suggests ways in which the procedure I suggest
could be extended beyond the context of class actions. Part VI describes
the results of the application of the procedure to an explicit formal model;
the mathematics are presented in appendix B. Part VII summarizes my
conclusions.
I.

AGGREGATION AND SAMPLING: JUDGE PARKER'S SOLUTION TO MASS

TORT LITIGATION

If the Court could somehow close thirty cases a month, it would

take six and one-half years to try these cases and there would
be pending over 5,000 untouched cases at the present rate of
filing. [JUDGE PARKER, Cimino]

Cimino v. Raymark went to trial as a class action with 2,298 plaintiffs
and five defendants. The trial consisted of three phases. In phase 1, a set
2 Michael J. Saks & Peter David Blanck, Justice Improved: The Unrecognized Benefits
of Aggregation and Sampling in the Trial of Mass Torts, 44 Stan. L. Rev. 815 (1992).
' This assumes, of course, that the cases would have been tried. As Judge Parker pointed
out in his opinion, the defendants "assert a right to individual trials in each case and assert
the right to repeatedly contest in each case every contestable issue involving the same
products, the same warnings, and the same conduct. The strategy is a sound one; the
defendants know that if the procedure in Cimino is not affirmed, these cases will never be
tried" (Cimino v. Raymark "651-52).
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of issues common to all plaintiffs and defendants were resolved. 4 Phase
2 apportioned causation among the defendants and determined which
plaintiffs had had sufficient exposure to asbestos, based on each plaintiff's workplace and craft, for such exposure to be a producing cause of
an asbestos-related injury or disease.'
The purpose of phase 3 was to determine damages. Instead of trying all
cases, the court divided the plaintiffs into five categories, according to the
asbestos-related disease from which each suffered. A random sample was
drawn from each category; the sample was larger for categories with more
plaintiffs.6 The sample cases were tried. Plaintiffs in the sample received
the damages that they were awarded. Plaintiffs not in the sample received
the average of the damages awarded to the tried cases in their category.
Judge Parker argued that the result was fair to the defendants since the
total amount awarded was an accurate estimate of the total that would
have been awarded if all cases had been tried. He cited confidence levels
ranging from 95 percent to 99 percent but did not explain what those
numbers meant or what assumptions were used to calculate them.
The situation is not quite so clear as Judge Parker apparently believed.
The statistical conclusions reported, if correct, depend on assumptions
about the distribution of the awards that would be produced by jury trial.
It is possible to describe distributions consistent with the observed data
for which the result of even as large a sample as was used in Cimino
would be a very imprecise measure of the total damages that would be
awarded.7 With such a distribution, the expected result of the Cimino
procedure would still be correct: if the procedure were repeated a large
enough number of times, the average outcome would be very close to
' The issues were whether each asbestos-containing insulation product manufactured by
each defendant, settling and nonsettling, was defective and unreasonably dangerous, the
adequacy of warnings, the state of the art defense and the fiber type defense. The question
of punitive damages in the entire case of the 2,298 class representatives was also submitted
for jury determination.
5 Phase 2 was resolved by stipulation by the parties.
6 The increase in sample size was less than proportional, as one would expect if the
objective was to get equally reliable results for each category. The opinion states that
"[w]hen setting the sample size for each disease category, the Court sought a confidence
level of 95%, in other words ±2.00 standard deviations" (Cimino v. Raymark *664). The
numbers (samples of 50 each for two categories with 1,050 and 972 plaintiffs) suggest that
the court did not apply any very precise statistical rule.
7 One example is a distribution in which a very small number of plaintiffs have cases
that, if tried, will generate enormous damage awards. If there is only one such plaintiff,
and 10 percent of the cases selected at random are tried, there is a 90 percent chance that
his case will not be selected and will thus have no influence on the observed results. But
if the damage award he would get is large enough, his case may have a very large effect
on what the total award to all plaintiffs would be if all cases were tried.
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the result of trying every case separately. But the probability that the
result produced by the Cimino procedure would be substantially different
from the result of trying all cases might be much larger than implied by
the confidence levels cited by the judge. 8 This suggests that it might be
worth looking for a procedure superior to random sampling.
Even if, as Judge Parker argues, the procedure is fair to the defendants,
there remains the question of whether it properly allocates the damage
payment among the individual plaintiffs. The procedure used in Cimino
does not do so, as Judge Parker himself conceded. 9 He dealt with that
problem by obtaining the plaintiffs' assent in advance. In future litigation
involving such procedures, however, the question will be important for
at least five reasons.
1. Many people regard justice as part of what litigation is supposed to
produce. If a procedure collects the right amount of damages but gives
them to the wrong people, or to the right people but in the wrong
amounts, it is not just.
2. One purpose of some of the legal rules that determine damages,
such as contributory negligence, is to affect the incentives of potential
plaintiffs. In Cimino, some plaintiffs whose cases were tried received no
damages, possibly because their decision to smoke was regarded by the
jury as contributory negligence. " The effect of such verdicts was to reduce the award given to all plaintiffs in the same disease category whose
cases were not tried, smokers and nonsmokers alike. So the use of the
procedure undercuts the effectiveness of such a legal rule.
3. In order for a class to be certified, the judge must find that the
representative parties will fairly and adequately protect the interests of
8 Judge Parker's statement that "[diefendants complain about the 1% likelihood that the
result would be significantly different" (Cimino v. Raymark *666) suggests that he interprets
a 99 percent confidence level as a probability of 99 percent that the procedure will yield a
result within some (unspecified) significant error-where "significant" means "important,"

not "statistically significant."
Whatever error he did use, what ought he to have used? One possibility would be to
compare the procedure to the result of individual trials, taking account of the difference in
litigation costs. Suppose, for example, that aggregation saves the defense a million dollars
in legal expenses. One might then ask how likely it is that the award is more than a million
dollars greater than what would have been awarded if all cases were tried. If the answer is
.01, there is then only one chance in a hundred that the procedure has made the defendants
worse off. While that approach solves the problem of picking an appropriate error, it still
leaves the problem that statistics cannot generate such probabilities without making assumptions about the characteristics of the sample.
9 "Individual members of a disease category who will receive an award that might be
different from one they would have received had their individual case been decided by a
jury have waived any objections" (Cimino v. Raymark *665).
10 The opinion discusses under what circumstances smoking would constitute contributory negligence and notes that some plaintiffs received awards of zero, but it does not say
whether any received zero awards for that reason.
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the class." A procedure that predictably awards some plaintiffs more
than they would get from trying their case themselves and others less
may not meet the requirement.
4. Even if the class is certified, individual members are free to withdraw. A procedure that predictably awards some plaintiffs less than they
would receive at trial gives such plaintiffs an incentive to withdraw from
the class, which reduces the benefit both of the class action and of the
procedure. 2
5. In awarding the right amount of damages to the wrong people, the
Cimino procedure resembles fluid recovery. Under fluid recovery, where
it is difficult to identify the members of the plaintiff class and determine
how much of the award each is entitled to, money awarded to the plaintiffs is instead used to benefit a group of people similar to those who were
injured. That approach has been seriously questioned by the courts. 3
For all of these reasons, it is desirable to construct procedures that
approximate the correct result among plaintiffs as well as between plaintiffs and defendants. In Cimino, Judge Parker attempted to do so in two
ways. Phase 2 of the trial was designed to eliminate from the case plaintiffs whose exposure to asbestos was not a producing cause of an asbestos-related injury or disease. In phase 3, plaintiffs were grouped according to the particular sort of injury or disease they had suffered,
presumably because individuals suffering from the same disease would
have some tendency to be owed the same damages.
Both of these are very imprecise ways of allocating damage payments to
individual plaintiffs. Saks and Blanck offer two additional possibilities. One
is to use statistical analysis to define groups with common characteristics.
The other is to construct a linear model relating damages to characteristics,
use trial results to estimate the parameters of the model, and then use the
estimated parameters to calculate damage awards for the untried cases. 14
1 Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 23a(4).
12Suppose the court uses an aggregation process that awards every plaintiff the average
of what all plaintiffs in the class are entitled to. Plaintiffs who can expect an above average
return withdraw from the class. That lowers the average that the remainder can expect to
get, causing more plaintiffs to withdraw. Under some circumstances, the entire class may
come apart in this way. This is a form of adverse selection, more familiar in the context of
insurance. See George Akerlof, The Market for "Lemons": Quality Uncertainty and the
Market Mechanism, 336 Q. J. Econ. 488 (1970).
13It was permitted in David Daar v. Yellow Cab Co., 67 Cal. 2d 695, 433 P.2d 732, 63
Cal. Rptr. 724, rejected by the Second Circuit in Eisen v. Carlisle and Jacquelin, 479 F.2d
1005, and has not been ruled upon by the Supreme Court.
14Saks & Blanck, supra note 2, at 851. Glen 0. Robinson & Kenneth S. Abraham,
Collective Justice in Tort Law, 78 Va. L. Rev. 1481 (1992), suggests and discusses several
other statistical approaches to dealing with mass torts, using information from the outcomes
of similar cases to determine, or at least affect, awards.
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While these procedures can improve on the simple approach of giving
every plaintiff the same amount or the slightly more complicated approach implemented in Cimino, they suffer from a common problem. It
is neither obvious in advance nor uncontroversial what characteristics
are relevant to the damage award or how they are related. Even if we
knew the characteristics, there is no reason to assume the relation is
linear. '5 As statisticians are aware, the same data can be fit with a multitude of different specifications. If, after trying a few thousand, the court
finds one that happens to fit the tried cases fairly well, that should not
give us much confidence that it will also fit the untried cases.
What we need is not a procedure for dividing the damage award among
the plaintiffs-the best way of doing that will almost certainly vary from
case to case. What we need is a procedure that makes it in the interest
of someone to figure out, for any particular case, what the correct division
among the plaintiffs in that case is. Part 2 describes one such procedure.
II.

PLAINTIFFS CUT, DEFENDANT CHOOSES:

16

AN INCENTIVE-COMPATIBLE

PROCEDURE FOR LITIGATING MASS TORTS

I define the strength of a plaintiff's case as the average of what would
be awarded if it were tried many times by many separate juries; I call
this average verdict (for plaintiff i) di. The objective of the procedure is
to produce a damage award of about di for each defendant i, at a cost
much lower than the cost of trying every case many times or even trying
every case once.
By examining the facts relevant to an individual plaintiff i, an investigator can estimate the value of di. The more resources are spent on the
investigation, the more accurate the estimate will be. This is true both
for an individual investigator and for a judge or jury calculating an award
in the course of a trial. I assume the cost to a competent individual
investigator of estimating d i is much lower than the cost of a trial that
produces an estimate, in the form of a verdict, with the same accuracy,
since the investigator is a specialist in such investigations, is an individual
rather than a committee, and is not limited by the elaborate procedural
rules that control court trials. 7
'5 As Saks and Blanck point out, average jury awards seem to increase less than linearly
with the amount of injury suffered by the plaintiff (id. at 840).
16In explaining my proposed procedure, I assume that it is being applied to a case with
many plaintiffs and one defendant; the application to the less common case of one plaintiff
and many defendants should be straightforward.
17 One reason such rules are necessary is that the decision maker in a trial has only weak
incentives to reach the correct decision and can therefore not be trusted to do so unless
severely constrained. Under the proposed procedures, it is in the private interest of the
decision maker (the plaintiffs' attorney) to estimate the strength of claims accurately, making such constraints less necessary.
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We start with a group of N plaintiffs represented by an attorney. The
procedure is as follows:
STEP 1. The plaintiffs' attorney produces, for each plaintiff i, a claim
Ci, which is the amount the attorney claims that plaintiff i ought to receive
in damages. For reasons that will become clear below, it will be in the
attorney's interest to make C, proportional to his estimate of d,.
STEP 2.
The plaintiffs' attorney gives his list of claims Ci to the defendant's attorney.
STEP 3.
The defendant's attorney selects from the list a small number
of cases to be tried. For simplicity in exposition, assume that 10 cases
are to be selected and that the cases selected turn out to be those of
plaintiffs 1-10.
STEP 4. These cases are tried. The court awards damages Di to each
of the 10 plaintiffs.
STEP

5.

The court calculates R = (DI/C I

+

D 2 /C 2

+

.

. .

+

D10 /

C10)/10, and awards damages of R x Ci to each of the N plaintiffs.
Under this procedure, it should be possible to resolve the N cases
much more cheaply than with N separate trials. Only 10 cases actually
have to be litigated. All plaintiffs have their damages estimated, but the
estimate is made for everyone else by the plaintiffs' attorney.
Why does the procedure generate actual damages for plaintiff i close
to di? Consider the situation first from the standpoint of the defense
attorney at step 3. He wants to select plaintiffs whose claims C, are large
relative to di, the amount a court would, on average, award them. By
selecting plaintiffs who have overclaimed, he produces a low value of
R and thus reduces the total amount (R EiCi) his client must pay in
damages.
Next consider the situation from the standpoint of the plaintiffs' attorney at step 1. Because he knows that the defense attorney will try to
select for trial plaintiffs with a high ratio of C to di, he maximizes the
total payments his clients receive by trying to make the ratio the same
for all clients. The simplest way of doing so is to set Ci equal to his
estimate of di for each client. S So the amount claimed for each plaintiff
will be equal to his attorney's estimate of what he can expect to get at
trial.' 9
The award received by a particular plaintiff may deviate from what he
'a The plaintiffs' attorney can achieve the same objective by attempting to set C i proportional to di: C i = Kdi, where K is some constant. The value of K has no effect on the
outcome; R, on average, will be I/K, so plaintiffs will receive R x C i = (di), independent
of K. I therefore assume K = 1 for simplicity in exposition.
19 As we will see later, this statement is only approximately true. If some cases are
harder to evaluate than others, the optimal strategy for the plaintiffs' attorney may deviate
somewhat from that described here.
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ought to receive for two reasons: the court may give the wrong verdicts
for the cases tried, or the plaintiffs' attorney may claim the wrong amount
for a particular plaintiff. Since 10 cases are tried separately and their
results averaged, the first source of error should be much smaller than if
each plaintiff's case had been tried by itself.2" Since the attorney can
estimate di much less expensively than a court, the second source of
error can be made smaller than it would be with an actual trial, while
still keeping litigation expenses (including the expense of making such
estimates) well below those of individual trials. So it should be possible
to produce a more accurate verdict at lower cost under this procedure
than with individual trials. The cost is higher than with the Cimino procedure since additional costs are born by the plaintiffs' attorney in making
claims and the defendant's attorney in choosing cases to litigate. But this
procedure, unlike that one, generates separate results for each plaintiff
proportioned to the strength of each plaintiff's case.
The procedure as I have described it makes sense for a hundred plaintiffs, for a thousand, or perhaps for more. In Cimino, the information
actually collected included medical evaluations for about 1,400 of the
2,298 plaintiffs who eventually went to trial, so much of the research
required by my suggested procedure had actually been done. But it makes
less sense for the sort of class action that involves a very large number
of plaintiffs, most with very small claims. In such a case, evaluating each
plaintiff's case in order to decide how much to claim for him might cost
more than the total damages awarded.
One approach to such a situation would be to allow the plaintiffs' attorney to state Ci for classes of plaintiffs rather than for individual plaintiffs.
Thus he might claim that each heavy smoker born before 1960 was entitled to $10, each light smoker born between 1960 and 1970 to $2, and so
on. The defendant's attorney would select classes for trial; individual
cases would be selected from those classes at random. Such a variant on
the procedure might be appropriate in situations where individual claims
are low and separate estimates for each case thus unreasonably expensive.
A more sophisticated approach would combine the procedure described here with an idea suggested by Saks and Blanck. 2" Instead of
producing a claim for each plaintiff, the plaintiffs' attorney produces a
statistical model showing how he believes that the amount each plaintiff
is entitled to should depend on the characteristics of the plaintiff. The
20 This is one of the central points made by Saks and Blanck in defending the Cimino
procedure. Saks & Blanck, supra note 2, at 833-36.
21 id. at 851.
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defendant's attorney specifies a sampling protocol, describing how plaintiffs are to be selected for trial based on their characteristics. The court
then selects plaintiffs for trial at random, subject to the constraints of the
sampling protocol. The verdicts for those plaintiffs are used to estimate
the parameters of the model, and awards for all plaintiffs are calculated
accordingly.
In the simplest version of this, the plaintiffs' attorney would specify
the entire model save for one multiplicative parameter. If, for example,
he believed that the amount awarded ought to depend linearly on the age
of the plaintiff and the number of years he had worked at a site using
asbestos, he might offer the model
Damages = A ($100,000 - $1,000 x Age in Years
+ $10,000 x Years Worked on Site).
The defense would then specify the range of ages and work histories
that were to be sampled, and the court would choose plaintiffs within
that range at random. Their cases would be tried, and the results used to
calculate A.
In a more elaborate version, the plaintiffs' attorney would specify only
the form of the model. An example might be
Damages = A - B x Age in Years + C x Years Worked on Site
+ D x (Years Worked on Site) 2 .
The defense would again specify the characteristics of plaintiffs to be
selected for trial, and the court would choose at random plaintiffs with
those characteristics.
While both variants of this approach may sound complicated, especially to nonstatisticians, their logic is the same as that of the simpler
version described earlier. The difference is that the plaintiffs' attorney is
providing a description of how damages relate to characteristics, rather
than a claim for each plaintiff. The same logic as before makes it in his
interest to get the description right. If, for example, he erroneously claims
that the amount plaintiffs are entitled to does not depend on their age,
when a jury would actually award more to younger plaintiffs, the defense
can specify a sample heavily weighted toward older plaintiffs-and the
result will be to push down the total amount awarded.
The same logic applies to more subtle errors. Suppose the plaintiffs'
attorney specifies a linear relation of the form
Damages = A + BL,
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where L is (say) length of exposure to asbestos. Further suppose that the
real relation, the one that correctly predicts jury verdicts, is a quadratic
of the form
Damages = A + BL 2 .
The defense, if it recognizes the error, can specify a sample containing
only small values of L. Again the result will be to push down the total
verdict.
In each of these situations, just as with the simpler version of my
proposed procedure discussed earlier, an inaccurate specification by the
plaintiffs' attorney of the relative claims of different plaintiffs gives the
defense an opportunity to reduce the total amount awarded, which in
turn gives the plaintiffs' attorney an incentive to do an accurate job of
specifying the relative claims.
So far I have assumed that the cases we are considering are ones where
the plaintiffs seek money damages. The procedure can be generalized to
any case with a quantitative award-one describable by some cardinal
measure. An example would be a suit where the plaintiffs were employees
claiming seniority.
Another assumption I have been making is that tort litigation under my
procedure is always resolved by trial. What is the effect on the analysis
if we include the possibility of settlement?
Even if there is some possibility of settlement, the plaintiffs' attorney
still has an incentive to estimate the relative claims of the plaintiffs accurately. If the case goes to trial, inaccurate estimates will result in lower
total damages, since the defense will select the overclaimed cases for
trial. If the case settles, it will settle on less generous terms if the defense
believes that the estimates are inaccurate, and the plaintiffs thus likely
to do badly at trial.
So even when litigation leads to settlement, the procedure still provides
a mechanism for allocating damage payments to plaintiffs that reflects
the relative strength of their cases. By doing so, it should reduce the
conflict among plaintiffs over settlement terms and so make settlement
easier.
III.

THE LEGAL STATUS OF THE PROPOSED PROCEDURE

Suppose a judge wished to implement the procedure described in Part
II above. What legal problems would he face?
To begin with, he would face the same problem faced in Cimino: the
argument that due process required that each plaintiff have an opportunity to make his case in court and that the defendant should have the
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opportunity to rebut each plaintiff's case. If, as in Cimino, the plaintiffs
assented in advance to the procedure,22 the argument should be no
stronger here than there. If anything, the defendant's grounds for objection are even weaker under the procedure I have proposed. Insofar as
the defense believes that some plaintiffs have weak cases-weaker cases,
relative to other plaintiffs, than
their claims indicate-the defense is free
23
to select those cases for trial.
If the plaintiffs, instead of or in addition to the defendant, object, the
situation is somewhat more difficult. While the procedure saves the plaintiffs the cost of litigating every case separately, it also, for reasons I will
discuss in Part IV, has some built-in bias against the plaintiffs. The plaintiffs might reasonably demand either that the procedure be modified to
eliminate that bias (a possibility discussed below) or that they be compensated for accepting a biased procedure. Supposing that such objections
were met, the plaintiffs under my procedure seem to be in the same
situation as the defendants in Cimino; although their cases are not all
being tried, they are being given an opportunity to get approximately the
same awards they would get if they were tried, and at a much lower cost
in litigation.
There is one respect in which the procedure is more defensible than
that employed in Cimino-or, arguably, than the ordinary procedure for
a class action. Rule 23(a)(4) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure requires that the representative parties in a class action will fairly and
adequately protect the interests of the class. Under the procedure I have
proposed, the representative parties have a clear interest in doing so. If
they attempt to benefit themselves at the expense of other members of
the class by arranging for their attorney to overclaim on their behalf, the
defense will select their cases for trial.24 The representative parties will
22 Since the class was certified before the procedure was proposed, the assent was presumably by the representative plaintiffs controlling the litigation rather than by the unanimous decision of all plaintiffs. But the procedure created a conflict of interest among members of the class, which arguably called into question the ability of the representative
plaintiffs to represent the interests of the remaining plaintiffs.
23 For an extensive discussion of legal issues associated with aggregation, see Robinson
& Abraham, supra note 14.
24If it is not obvious that they are overclaiming, the defense may miss some of their
cases, in which case some of the overclaimed representative defendants will get more than
they should. On the other hand, given that possibility, one would expect the defense to
take special care in examining the claims made for the representative plaintiffs. I am assuming here that plaintiffs whose cases are actually tried get the amount awarded to them,
rather than having their award calculated from their claim in the same fashion as plaintiffs
whose cases are not tried. Without that assumption, representative plaintiffs gain by overclaiming even if they are sure their cases will be among those tried-although the attorney
for the class of plaintiffs loses, if his recompense is an increasing function of the total
amount awarded.
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gain nothing, and their attorney will have a lower total award out of
which to compensate himself.
IV.

PROBLEMS WITH THE PROCEDURE

There are two fundamental problems with the procedure I have described. The first is that, while it could produce a more accurate result
at a much lower cost than would individual trials, it is not entirely clear
that it will; it might instead produce a much more accurate result at a
higher cost. The second is that the procedure, as so far described, has a
built-in bias in favor of the defense.
Does It Save Money?
The method incorporated into phase III produces a level of
economy in terms of both judicial resources and transaction
cost that needs no elaboration. [JUDGE PARKER, Cimino]

At first glance it seems obvious that trying 160 cases costs a great deal
less than trying 2,298 cases, but this is not quite so clear as it seems.
Under the procedure employed in Cimino, the verdicts in the tried cases
determined the outcome for all of the other cases. The result is that the
amount at stake in each tried case was about 14 times as much as it
would have been if each case had only determined the outcome for that
plaintiff. With more at stake, we would expect both parties to spend more
on trying to win.
Whether this eliminates the cost savings of fewer trials depends on how
litigation expenditure varies with the amount at stake. 25 If the increase is
' I do not know of any definitive analysis of this question. One possible approach would
be to assume Nash equilibrium. The amount at stake is S. The probability that the plaintiff
will win the case depends on expenditures LP (by the plaintiff) and Ld (by the defendant):
P(LP, Ld). The parties increase their expenditures until they reach the point where a $1
increase in expenditure by the plaintiff increases his expected return (P(Lp, Ld)S) by $1,
and a $1 increase in expenditure by the defendant increases his expected return
(-P(Lp, Ld)S) by $1:
aP(Lp, Ld) S = 1,

and

aP(L, Ld)

1.

aLd

aLP(Ln

Under these assumptions, the question of how expenditure increases with amount at stake
becomes the question of how rapidly
aP(Lp, Ld)
8

Lpd

decreases as LP and Ld increase. If, for example,
aP(aLp, aLd)
aLp,d

1 8P(Lp, Ld)
(1

OLp,d
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proportional, the total cost of trials under either Cimino or the procedure
I have suggested will be the same as if every case were tried separately;
the only advantage of the procedure would then be the increased accuracy, due both to trying cases much more carefully and to using the
average of the tried cases, rather than the result of one case, in calculating
26
the amount to be awarded to each plaintiff whose case is not tried.
Suppose, however, that expenditure rises less than proportionally with
the amount at stake, everything else held constant.27 Under that assumption, expenditure on the tried cases becomes less and less important as
the number of plaintiffs increases since the larger the number of plaintiffs
the smaller the fraction necessary to provide an adequate sample. In the
limit of a very large number of plaintiffs, expenditure on trying the sample
of cases is negligible compared to the cost of trying the cases individually.
That is consistent with what actually happened in Cimino.
So far I have been considering a problem raised by both the Cimino
procedure and the procedure I have proposed. There is an additional cost
problem that applies only to the latter. Under that procedure, the plaintiffs' attorney spends resources estimating the relative claims of each
plaintiff, 28 and the defendant's attorney then spends resources examining
plaintiffs in order to decide which cases to select for trial.
Under our assumptions, the plaintiffs' attorney can produce his estimates of claims more accurately and less expensively than verdicts would
be produced by individual trials. The same should be true for the defense
attorney. In addition, if the number of cases is large, the defense need
only examine a random sample of cases in order to do a reasonably good
job of locating overclaimed cases to select for trial. It follows that the

then expenditure increases more (less) than in proportion to the amount at stake if 13< 1
(3 > 1).
One objection to this approach is that Nash equilibrium is not very plausible in a game
involving only two parties, and it is still less plausible in a situation where the two parties
can and do bargain with each other.
26 In the case of the Cimino procedure, that must be balanced against the decreased accuracy from awarding plaintiffs whose cases are not selected for trial average verdicts even
though the particular plaintiff may not have average characteristics.
27The comparison is between two cases whose only difference is the amount at stake;
each of my 10 cases is simply one of the thousands of cases that might be tried individually.

I am not assuming that the ratio of litigation cost to the amount at stake for the typical
large case is smaller than for the typical small case; presumably the typical large case not
only has more at stake but also a more complicated set of legal and factual issues than the
typical small case.
2 Or the plaintiff's attorney spends resources determining how the amount a plaintiff is
entitled to is related to the plantiff's characteristics, under the alternative version that I
proposed for cases with very large numbers of plaintiffs and small average claims.
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attorneys can act in a way that, under the proposed procedure, produces
more justice at a considerably lower cost than would individual trials.
It is not, however, clear that it is in their interest to do so. Each
attorney's objective, at least in part, is to benefit his clients at the expense
of the other party. By making a more accurate set of estimates, the plaintiffs' attorney not only produces a more just distribution among his clients, he also makes it harder for the defense to locate overclaimed plaintiffs for trial. The more he spends on improving the accuracy of his
claims, the larger the amount his side will receive. He must balance that
benefit against the associated cost. The defense attorney faces a similar
situation.
Here, as elsewhere in the economics of litigation, there is no reason
to assume that the level of expenditure that is privately optimal for one
party to a legal dispute is also socially optimal. The amount spent on
estimating claims and detecting overclaimed plaintiffs will depend on detailed assumptions about information costs and distributions of claims,
as we will see in the formal analysis presented in Appendix B and discussed in Part VI.
It follows from these arguments that we cannot be sure the procedure
as described will cost less than ordinary trial without aggregation and
sampling. This suggests two further queries. The first is whether we can
say anything interesting about the relation between the costs of alternative approaches and the number of plaintiffs. The second is whether, if
experience suggests that expenditures associated with the procedure are
undesirably large, there may be ways of modifying it to reduce such
expenditures.
An increase in the number of plaintiffs reduces the percentage of cases
that must be tried. If expenditure per case increases less than proportionately with the amount at stake, the result is that trial costs for my suggested procedure (or the Cimino procedure) decrease, relative to the cost
of trying all cases, as the number of plaintiffs increases.
The same is probably true for the cost to the defense of selecting cases
for trial. The larger the number of plaintiffs, the smaller the fraction that
must be sampled in order to find 10 cases from (say) the most overclaimed
5 percent. We would expect defense expenditures to increase less than
proportionally with the number of plaintiffs, and so become smaller and
smaller, relative to the total amount at stake, as the number of plaintiffs
increases. This result is demonstrated in Appendix B for the particular
distributions assumed there.
The opposite result can be expected for the cost to the plaintiffs' attorney of calculating claims. The more plaintiffs there are, the easier it is
for the defense to locate those who have overclaimed. The more accu-
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rately the defense can locate overclaimed plaintiffs, the greater the incentive for the plaintiffs' attorney to make accurate claims. So an increase
in the number of plaintiffs will tend to increase the amount spent per
plaintiff by the plaintiffs' attorney. That is one reason why it might be
desirable to shift from individual claims to statistical models when the
number of plaintiffs becomes sufficiently large. The per-plaintiff cost of
estimating the parameters of a model to a given accuracy will fall as the
number of plaintiffs increases.
The size of the expenditures by the attorneys will depend on details of
the distribution of claims and on the functions relating expenditure on
investigating a claim to information produced. We cannot predict a priori
how large it will be, any more than we can predict a priori, in the case
of ordinary litigation, how much of the damages awarded will be eaten
up in litigation costs. But if experience indicates that the attorneys are
spending more than the improved accuracy their expenditure generates
is worth, we can lower the amount they spend by a minor change in the
procedure.
The incentive for the expenditures we (hypothetically) wish to reduce
comes from their influence on the damages that will be awarded.2 9 A
court that wishes to reduce those expenditures can do so by selecting
some cases for trial in the fashion I have described and some at random.
The smaller the proportion of cases selected for trial by the defense,
the lower the incentive that both attorneys have to spend more money
estimating claims more accurately. Thus courts have a mechanism by
which they can adjust the procedure to move its outcome closer to an
optimal level of cost and accuracy. An alternative approach would be to
try to impose limits on the amount each party was permitted to spend on
evaluating claims.3"
Bias in the Procedure: Who Cuts, Who Lies, and Other Fine Points
In the procedure as I have described it, the plaintiffs' attorney calculates claims, and the defendant's attorney selects which will be tried: the
former cuts and the latter chooses, to take the obvious analogy from the
incentive-compatible procedure for dividing a piece of cake. Is there any
29 It is possible that the plaintiffs' attorney may have additional incentives, due to concerns with either justice or risk among his clients. They might prefer that claims be proportional to the actual injury each client has suffered, even if claims did not affect the total
amount paid out.
30 In a class action, a judge could limit expenditure by one side simply by limiting the
expenses he was willing to permit the class attorney to claim. Limiting expenditure by the
other party, or by both parties if the procedure was being used outside of a class action,
would be more difficult.
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good reason to do it this way, instead of requiring the defendant's attorney to list the amount he believes each plaintiff should receive and letting
the plaintiffs' attorney choose which cases will be tried?
One reason is that the attorney who is calculating claims will need
information from the plaintiffs that they might be reluctant to provide to
the defense attorney, for fear that it would be used against them in trial.
The procedure I have described does not eliminate this problem-the
defense attorney still needs enough information to decide which cases to
select for trial. But, if the group is large, he can do an adequate job by
examining only a small subset of the plaintiffs and can thus afford to
spend much more per case examined than the plaintiffs' attorney. That
should make it possible for him to produce a reasonably accurate estimate
even with less cooperation from the individual plaintiff.3 '
The defense attorney is not the only one who must worry about being
misled by individual plaintiffs. Plaintiff i gains by increases in Ci above
di, even though the plaintiffs as a group lose, so each plaintiff has an
incentive, in dealing with his own attorney, to inflate his claim. A plaintiff's attorney would presumably specify in his contract with the plaintiffs, whether representative plaintiffs in a class action or joint plaintiffs
in an ordinary joint action, their obligations to furnish information that
he requires in estimating their claims. Thus the procedure yields a contractual equivalent of discovery rules between the plaintiffs and their
attorney. Although each plaintiff gains by his own ability to mislead his
attorney, he loses by the ability of all other plaintiffs to do the same, so
plaintiffs and their attorney have a common interest in agreeing to rules
that will allow the attorney to make an accurate estimate of the strength
of each plaintiff's case.
One consequence of having the plaintiffs' attorney cut and the defendant's attorney choose is to give the latter a cost advantage, at least in
situations where the number of plaintiffs is large. As discussed earlier,
the party who chooses can use random sampling to identify overclaimed
cases at a relatively low total cost. This advantage may or may not outweigh the advantage that the plaintiffs' attorney has, due to the fact that
the plaintiffs, who possess private information relevant to the strength of

31 Presumably there would be legal rules requiring some cooperation from the plaintiffs.
"[M]ost courts have taken the view that reasonably necessary discovery against individual
class members should be allowed as a matter of judicial discretion, but that discovery is
not available of right as it would be against a party to a nonclass suit (see, e.g., Brennan
v. Midwestern United Life Ins. Co., 450 F.2d 999 (7th Cir. 1971))." Fleming James, Jr., &
Geoffrey C. Hazard, Jr., Civil Procedure 579 (3d ed. 1985).
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their cases, are his clients and have agreed to make such information
available to him.
A second consequence is to give the defense an advantage in the final
verdict. As I show in Appendix A, the defense can produce an expected
total damage payment equal to the expected payment under a system
of individual trials by simply selecting cases for trial at random, with
probabilities proportional to Ci. By examining cases and selecting those
that appear to be overclaimed, the defense should be able to improve on
that result.
How significant these advantages are will depend on the details of the
underlying fact-finding technology-how accurately and at what cost
each attorney can estimate di. If the net advantage to the defense turns
out to be large, 32 and if we wish neither to change the tort system in a
way that advantages defendants in mass torts nor to give plaintiffs an
incentive to avoid the procedure in favor of individual litigation, we could
compensate by altering other legal rules applicable to the procedure in
ways that advantage plaintiffs.
An alternative approach would be to eliminate the bias by allowing
both parties to cut and both to choose. Under such a system, the plaintiffs' attorney produces a set of claims Ct, and the defense produces a
set of claims C a . Each attorney selects a set of cases to be tried. The
court calculates two values of R: RP is calculated using the plaintiffs'
claims and the verdicts of the cases selected by the defense; Rd is calculated using the defense claims and the verdicts of the cases selected by
the plaintiffs' attorney. Each plaintiff i receives the average of RPC' and
RdC a . This version of the procedure will cost more to produce a given
level of accuracy in the relative claims since each is being calculated
twice. But it eliminates the bias in the outcome.33 It may or may not
increase the total cost of the procedure. Since each set of calculations
plays only half the role it did before in determining the amount actually
32This does not require the defense attorney to be better at estimating (di) than the
plaintiffs' attorney, as should be clear from the analysis above. If, for example, accurate
estimates are very expensive and the number of plaintiffs is large, the plaintiffs' attorney
will produce very inaccurate estimates and the defendant's attorney, spending much more
per case on a small fraction of the cases, will be able to find cases that are greatly overclaimed, thus greatly reducing the total amount paid out in damages.
33 That conclusion depends on assuming that both sides are equally able to generate the
relevant information. If, as suggested earlier, the plaintiffs' attorney has better access to
information about plaintiffs, the version of the procedure described here is biased in favor
of the plaintiffs. If one knew how great the informational advantage was, one could compensate for it by using an appropriately weighted average of the awards calculated from the
two different sets of claims.
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awarded, the parties have an incentive to spend less than before on increased accuracy. That may or may not balance the increased cost of
having each claim calculated twice and having each party try to identify
cases that the other has overclaimed 4
V.

APPLICATIONS OUTSIDE OF CLASS ACTIONS

My analysis so far has assumed that the procedure I am describing will
be used, as the Cimino procedure was, in a class action. It might also be
applied to an ordinary joint action with a large number of plaintiffs. The
use of the procedure ought to make such a joint action easier to organize
since it provides a mechanism for solving the problem of allocating damages among the joint plaintiffs. After a putative mass tort had occurred,
one or more lawyers would announce that he was forming a group of
plaintiffs to litigate under the procedure; his announcement would include
the formula by which he would be reimbursed. Plaintiffs would be free
to join his group, to join another group, or to litigate individually.
My discussion has focused on mass torts because the procedure requires a single agent representing the defense and a single agent representing the plaintiffs. A lawyer who assembles a group of plaintiffs for a
joint action satisfies the second requirement; the fact that all of the plaintiffs are suing the same defendant satisfies the first. This raises the question of whether other ways of satisfying these requirements might make
it possible to use the procedure to reduce litigation costs outside of the
context of mass torts. Consider the following radical proposal:
A court bundles the cases before it into large groups, defined by common characteristics-a thousand intellectual property cases, a thousand
personal injury cases, a thousand defamation cases. Each group is then
auctioned off twice, with attorneys bidding for the right to represent all
plaintiffs and for the right to represent all defendants. In the former auction, the attorney is offering to pay a sum in exchange for the right to
represent the plaintiffs and collect all damages awarded to them: high bid
wins. In the latter, the attorney is stating for what sum he will agree to
represent the defendants and pay all damages awarded against them: low
bid wins.
The two winning attorneys then go through the procedure I have described. When it is over, the defense attorney pays the plaintiffs' attorney

I If we assumed that each party aimed at the same level of accuracy as under the earlier
version of the procedure, expenditure would be increased but not doubled by requiring
each party to both cut and choose. The information generated in cutting can also be used
in choosing. The defense attorney's first step in identifying overclaimed cases will be to
compare the plantiffs' attorney's claims with his own.

HeinOnline -- 39 J.L. & Econ. 228 1996

MORE JUSTICE FOR LESS MONEY

the total damages awarded: R x IiC i . Each defendant pays the defense

attorney

(C,/Z

c1)

xRd

where Bd is the attorney's bid: the amount for which he agreed to be
responsible for all costs and damages. Thus the defendants are dividing
their total costs in proportion to the amounts owed to their respective
plaintiffs. Similarly, the plaintiffs' attorney pays each plaintiff i an amount

(Ci /Z c1) xBP
where BP is the plaintiffs' attorney's bid: the amount he offered to pay
for the right to collect all damage payments:
There are obvious problems to implementing this radical version of my
proposal within our legal system since it deprives both plaintiffs and
defendants of the right to choose their own attorneys. One solution would
be to treat it as a form of alternate dispute resolution: cases go into groups
subject to the procedure only if both plaintiff and defendant agree.
The general procedure could also be used in situations other than class
actions where a single agent already controls what are really multiple
cases. One example would be disputes between insurance companies,
each of which controls a large number of legal claims for accidents involving its customers. In that context, the procedure would be a way of
guaranteeing to each customer that the insurance company was fairly
representing his interests in the litigation.
The procedure would be inappropriate if the agent who controlled multiple cases also fully owned them. Such an agent would care about the
total awarded to all of the cases he owns, not the distribution among
them. The Cimino procedure would give the correct total at a lower cost
than the procedure discussed here. Such a situation could occur in the
insurance context. It might also arise if, as some writers have suggested,
tort claims were made fully marketable, allowing legal entrepreneurs to
buy up large numbers of related claims and litigate them en masse.11
" For discussions of the idea of marketable claims, see Marc J. Shukaitis, A Market in
Personal Injury Tort Claims, 16 J. Legal Stud. 329 (1987); David Friedman, Private Creation
and Enforcement of Law: A Historical Case, 8 J. Legal Stud. 399 (1979); David Friedman,
"What Is Fair Compensation for Death or Injury? 2 Int'l Rev. L. & Econ. 81 (1982);
Jonathan R. Macey & Geoffrey P. Miller, The Plaintiffs' Attorney's Role in Class Action
and Derivative Litigation: Economic Analysis and Recommendations for Reform, 58 U.
Chi. L. Rev. 1 (1991).
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Under such institutions the damage award would reach the victim in the
form of the price for which he sold his claim, so the distribution among
victims would be determined by the market rather than directly by the
court. In this context, the radical version of the procedure described
above can be seen as an alternative way of selling claims designed to
eliminate the cost of separately bargaining over each transaction.
VI.

RESULTS OF THE FORMAL MODEL

Appendix B presents a formal model, based on an error distribution
that is bounded and uniform. I demonstrate that, as the number of cases
goes to infinity, the defense is able to perfectly identify overclaimed cases
at a cost that is vanishingly small relative to the amount at stake. The
plaintiffs maximize their net return by spending the same amount in investigating each case and claiming an amount equal to their estimate of
the expected return at trial.
The result becomes more complicated if we assume that some cases
are more difficult to evaluate than others. The optimal strategy is then to
estimate those cases less accurately, insuring against the risk that the
resulting estimate may be too high by deliberately claiming less than their
estimated value.
Several further points are worth noting about this situation. The first
is that cases that are difficult for the plaintiffs' attorney will also be difficult for the defense attorney, so the defense has an incentive not to
examine those cases. The lower the probability that a certain sort of case
will be examined, the less the risk of overclaiming for such cases, so this
effect will
work in the opposite direction from that demonstrated in the
36
model.

A second point arises if plaintiffs are risk averse. Cases that are difficult
for the attorneys are also difficult for the court, so plaintiffs with hard
cases face a bigger gamble if they go to court individually and thus gain
more by replacing that gamble with the more certain outcome generated
by the procedure I have proposed. In addition, hard cases are likely to
be more expensive to litigate, again making the procedure particularly
attractive as a substitute for individual trial to plaintiffs with hard cases.
So even if the procedure gives plaintiffs with hard cases somewhat less
than their expected return at trial, that may not make them less willing
to join the class than plaintiffs with easy cases.
If, despite these considerations, the incentive to underclaim hard cases
36 That is not true for the formal model of Appendix B in the limit of large N because, in
that situation, the defense is able to perfectly identify overclaimed cases at negligible cost.
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turns out to be a serious problem, it can be dealt with in the same way
earlier suggested for dealing with the procedure's pro-defense bias. The
analysis of strategies with regard to hard cases is symmetrical; if the
defense cuts and the plaintiffs' attorney chooses, the defense has an incentive to overclaim hard cases. So if both parties cut and both choose,
the biases will tend to cancel.
One important limitation of the formal model of appendix B is that its
error distributions are bounded. The result is that, as the number of cases
increases, the additional gain to the defense of more and more accurately
identifying the overclaimed cases becomes less and less; there are no
cases to be found that are overclaimed by more than a factor of 1 + E.
If the error distribution for the plaintiffs' estimates is unbounded, and if
the defense can make the error of its estimate as small as it likes by
spending enough money examining enough cases, it is in the interest of
the defense to push R further and further down the larger the number of
cases, so that in the limit of an infinite number of cases damages awarded
would go to zero.
How serious a problem this is likely to be with plausible numbers of
cases and error distributions is an empirical issue. If it does turn out to
be a problem, it might be controlled by any of several modifications to
the procedure suggested earlier.
VII.

CONCLUSIONS

I have proposed a procedure that has the potential to settle mass torts
at a cost much less than individually litigating each claim. Like the Cimino procedure, it produces about the same outcome for the defense as
would individual trials. Unlike the Cimino procedure, it provides outcomes for the individual plaintiffs tailored to the strength of their individual cases; indeed, it may well produce a more accurate allocation of
damage payments to plaintiffs than would individual trials.
One can imagine applying the procedure in a variety of different contexts. In a case such as Cimino v. Raymark, where there are a large
number of plaintiffs each with a substantial claim, individual attorneys
might compete to form groups to litigate under the procedure, thus
avoiding some of the usual problems with class actions. Where individual
claims were smaller, the class could be formed in the usual way; the
procedure37 would then provide a way of allocating damages among plaintiffs. By reducing the risk that the plaintiffs' attorney would sacrifice
the interests of the absent plaintiffs to his own interest and that of the
37 Possibly the statistical version discussed above.
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representative plaintiffs, the procedure makes it more likely that a class
would, and should, be certified in such situations.
The procedure is not perfect; it provides no guarantee of an optimal
expenditure on evaluating cases in order to allocate damages. This is
equally true of alternatives, including the alternative of litigating each
case separately. Also, although the plaintiffs' attorney will find it in his
interest to make his claims roughly proportional to the strength of the
individual cases, the relation will not be exact; differences in the difficulty
of evaluating cases may, as demonstrated in the formal model, make it
in his interest to deliberately underclaim some cases relative to others.38
Finally, the simpler versions of the procedure are to some degree biased
in favor of the defense since the plaintiffs cut and the defense chooses.
If such problems prove serious, there are ways in which the procedure
can be modified to reduce them.
APPENDIX A
A SIMPLE STRATEGY FOR THE SECOND MOVER
Suppose we are dividing a cake under the conventional rule of "I cut, you
choose." Further suppose that we have identical tastes; each of us prefers the
larger slice. It seems obvious that, if there is any inaccuracy in cutting cakes,
the party who moves second has the advantage. One way of seeing this is to note
that if he selects his slice at random he will, on average, get half the cake; if he
has any ability at all to recognize the larger piece, he will do better than that. An
analogous argument implies that, under the procedure described in this article,
the defense can always do at least as well as it would with individual trials, and
may be able to do better. The analysis goes as follows:
Suppose that, instead of examining cases and trying to select the ones that

are overclaimed, the defense simply selects cases by a random process, with a
probability
Ci
i

of selecting case i. We then have

Expected Total Damage Payment = (R x Total Claims
I have presented this as a fault of the procedure, but it could be viewed as a desirable
consequence. It may be desirable, on grounds of either efficiency or justice, for parties
who insist on litigating difficult cases to bear part or all of the cost of doing so. Underclaiming difficult cases costs plaintiffs less than estimating the strength of their case as accurately
as easy cases are estimated. Thus this feature of the procedure has consequences similar
to those of the usual (American) rule that each party must bear his own litigation costs:
plaintiffs with cases that are expensive to litigate take home less, net of litigation costs,
than parties who have suffered similar damage but have easy cases.
38
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which is the expected total damage payment with individual trials.
So a random procedure, with no examination at all, produces as good a result
for the defense as individual trials. By selecting cases that are overclaimed, the
defense can get a better result than that-a lower expected total damage payment-at some cost. If the cost is less than the gain, the defense does better
under this procedure than with individual trials. If the cost is greater than the
gain for all levels of expenditure on examining cases, the defense follows the
strategy described above and does as well as it would with individual trials.
APPENDIX B
THE FORMAL MODEL

There are N plaintiffs. Each plaintiff i has an expected result at trial di. The
distribution of di is described by a probability density p(d) and is the same for
all i. Its expected value is (d). All parties are risk neutral, so the plaintiffs'
attorney is trying to maximize expected damage payments net of expenditures
on investigating cases (in order to decide how much to claim for each) and litigating them, while the defense attorney is trying to minimize expected damage payments plus defense expenditures on investigating cases (in order to select some
for trial) and litigating them. A number N, of cases will be selected for trial by
the defense.
Either attorney can generate an estimate of di by spending an amount E i investigating that plaintiff's case. The value of the estimate will be
di = di(l + ei).

(B1)

Here ei is a random error, uniformly distributed between -E(Ei) and + e(Ei).
The more the attorney spends on investigating the case, the more accurate the
estimate
de(Ei)

dE

dEi

< 0.

(Assumption B 1)

Investigation is subject to diminishing returns-additional expenditures yield less
and less reduction in error:
d 2e(Ei)

dE2

> 0.

(Assumption B2)

There is no limit to how accurate the investigation can be if the attorney is willing
to spend enough-he could, for example, stage repeated dummy trials. So,
lim E(Ei) = 0.
Ei--

(Assumption B3)

Finally, I assume that the prior distribution p(d) is sufficiently flat, its support
sufficiently wide, and E(Ei) sufficiently small so that the conditional distribution
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p(dildi)
39 is essentially uniform between di = di/[l + E(Ei)] and d i = di/[1 E(Ei)].

My objective is to describe a Nash equilibrium, a pair of strategies such that
each party's strategy is optimal against the strategy of the other party. I will start
by deriving the plaintiffs' strategy in the limit of large N, then derive the defense
strategy in the general case, then use that argument to derive the plaintiffs' strategy in the general case. My objective is to provide something more than a sketch
but short of a full-blown proof; I will not, for example, demonstrate that the
solution I offer is unique.
THE PLAINTIFFS' STRATEGY: THE LIMIT OF LARGE

N

Consider the situation from the standpoint of the plaintiffs' attorney deciding
how much to spend examining each case. He plans to spend an amount Ei examining each case i, then make a claim Ci based on di, the estimate of di he produces.
How much should he spend on each case, and how should he then calculate Ci?
As N goes to infinity, the defense, as we will see below, can perfectly identify
the most overclaimed cases, 40 so the cases selected for trial will be those for
which di/C i is minimal.
The plaintiffs' attorney wishes to maximize the net gain to his clients. Since
the number of cases being tried is determined by the rules of the procedure,
not by the attorneys, we take expenditure for trial as fixed. 41 So the attorney
minimizes
Damage Payment Received - Expenditure on Examination
=

R

Ci

Ei =

[1

Ci -

Ei.

Here Di is the verdict from a jury trial of case i, and {t} is the set of cases tried.
Averaging this over many trials, and taking advantage of the fact that di = (Di),
where Di is the result of a single trial and (D) its expected value, we have

19The reason we need to assume a sufficiently flat prior distribution in order for this to
be true is that the conditional probability will depend both on the distribution of the error
and on the prior distribution, in a fashion described by Bayes's theorem. The reason we
must assume that e(E i ) << I is that otherwise a uniform distribution of e will not give
something close to a uniform distribution of 1/(1 + e). As should become clear, these are
simplifying assumptions designed to keep the formal analysis manageable, not likely to
have much effect on the (qualitative) results.
o More precisely, the defense can identify the most overclaimed cases that exist with
positive probability. There could be (say) a single case that was overclaimed by more than
any other but that the defense missed because it was not in the sample examined. As N
goes to infinity, the probability and, hence, the effect on average damages collected of any
single case goes to zero. Any kind of case with positive probability will be represented an
infinite number of times in the total (as N goes to infinity) and thus will be included in the
sample selected for examination by the defense.
4 The strategy followed in selecting cases might have some effect on the two sides'
incentives to spend money litigating them. Since I have no theory of litigation expenditures,
and in any case expect them to become insignificant relative to the total amount at stake
when N becomes sufficiently large, I ignore this possibility in the analysis.
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Expected Value of Damages - Expenditure on Examination

[ztj ] Z"j Ci -

= N- , iE
I

i

Ei = net benefit to plaintiffs (nbp).

In the large number situation, we can think of the cases as grouped; each group
contains cases with common values42 of E,, d,, and Ci. As N goes to infinity, the
number of cases in each group expands without limit. The defense can then select,
if it wishes, N, cases from those within a group, each of which has the minimal
value of (d,/Ci). It follows that all that matters about a group, so far as its effect
on R is concerned, is R i,defined as the minimal value of (dilCi) for cases in the
group. Under our assumptions, the lowest value of di consistent with a given pair
(d i, Ei) is di/[1 + E(Ei)], so R i = (di1 Ci){l/[1 + E(Ei)]}.
Imagine that there are two groups, i andj, such that R i > R1 . Since the defense
is trying to make R as low as possible, cases from group i will not be selected
for trial. So the plaintiffs' attorney can increase his clients' total damage payment
by increasing Ci. It follows that, if nbp is being maximized, R i = Rj for every
pair i, j. It follows that (still in the limit of large N)
R i = (di/Ci){lI[1 + E(Ei)]} = R.
Since E is chosen and spent before di is observed, the plaintiffs' attorney does
not have the option of making Ej depend on di. He could, however, use different
values of Ej for different cases and, for each observed di, set
C i = (di/R){1/[1 + E(Ei)]},

(B2)

thus making Ri = R. Averaging over many repetitions of the trial, and taking
advantage of the fact that the average value of d i is di and the average value of
di is (d), yields

I

(nbp)

[1 + (E)]

Ei

(B3)

There is some value of E that maximizes the expression
(d)
[1 + E(Ei)]

call that value E*. We have, for E
I

(d)

E*,
dE(E)
dE
[1 + E(E)]2 "

(B4)

The plaintiffs' attorney maximizes the net expected return for his clients by
setting E i = E* for all i. Having done so, Ci = (di/R){1/[1 + E(E*)]} for all i, so
Ci is proportional to d i. As pointed out earlier, the optimal values for Ci are
arbitrary up to a multiplicative constant, here represented by R. For simplicity
we may set R = 1/[1 + e(E*)], making Ci = di.
42 Or, more precisely, a narrow range of values. As N goes to infinity, we can make the
range as narrow as we wish.

HeinOnline -- 39 J.L. & Econ. 235 1996

THE JOURNAL OF LAW AND ECONOMICS

d.~(~
C i
(i +ce,)
FIGURE

BI

THE DEFENSE STRATEGY

We retain assumptions B1-B3 above. We further assume that the plaintiffs'
strategy is as described earlier: Ci = di, E, = E*, for all i. In order to avoid
confusion between variables corresponding to plaintiffs and defense, we relabel
E* as Ep, F(E*) as EP. We are now free to use E, ej to refer to defense expenditures and defense errors. Suppose the plaintiffs have made a claim Ci for case i.
The defense spends Ei to estimate di and gets a value di. Figure B I shows the
situation, including the probability distributions for di implied separately by the
observations of plaintiffs and defense. The implication of these two distributions
is that di is distributed uniformly between CJI(I + e,), the lowest value consistent
with the plaintiffs' estimate, and dI[l - E(Ei)], the highest value consistent with
the defense estimate. It follows that the expected value of d,/Ci, conditional on
Ci and di, is
di

i

____di
1
+
2 (1 + Fp-, C i 21[1 - F_(Ei)]

(B5a)

if
di
[1 + F(E)]-

Ci
(I +

E)

'

and

(i

C

i

=

[d1 [2[1-E,(E)] + 2[l +_E(E,)]]'

otherwise.
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Next consider the distribution of outcomes that the defense can expect from
spending E examining a case i. The situation is shown in Figure B2. Here pp is
the probability distribution for d i given Ci; Pd is the probability distribution for
di given Ci. Suppose the defense wishes to examine a number of cases Nd in
order to select N, of them for trial, spending Ed on each case examined. In order
to minimize (R),,it is sufficient (from eqq. [B5a] and [B5b]) to choose the N,
cases for which di/Ci is lowest. This corresponds, on Figure B2 to picking the
shaded region under Pd, with area N,/Nd.43 Here R m is the maximum ratio of
d i/C i selected for trial and depends on NINd and Ed.
Suppose that, as shown,
Rm < [1 + E(Ed)]
(1+ -E)

We then have, with a little manipulation,

di\

[I - -E(Ed)] +
3(1+ + ) +

ci

(B6)
(16

3

where the expected value, here and below, is taken over the cases selected for
trial. Combining equation (B5a) with equation (B6), we have, for a given value
of R m ,
di-1
-)

+
2(1 +

) 2[l - E(E/)]

EP) +

2
3(1 + Ep)

m

3[l

(B7)

R
- f(Ed)]

We also have, with a little more manipulation,
2 lJ!'
R

m

=

-(Ed)j I:+-

1 + 1-

1 +E

e(Ed)

(B8)

43The defense is ignoring Ci in picking cases to examine since, as we see by eqq. (B6)
and (B7), it can get the same (R) out of each level of Ci by picking the same fraction of
each. The analysis is being done for a particular value of Ci, but applies to every value.
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Substituting equation (B8) into equation (B7) gives us

3N/
=I

+

3[l

(=I.

E

E(Ed)]

-

The defense chooses Nd, Ed to minimize the expected damage payments plus
expenditure examining cases:

(R)

C i+

NdEd =

(R)N(d) +

NdEd =(1 +

i+

~d'

[21

L[,+

-

1] N(d) + NdE

Ed

dE(Ed)
d

+'E

3[1 - E(EdA)]

Setting the derivatives with respect to Nd and

-d(Ed

'

N(d)[1 +

Nd

3(1 + Ep)

\/(id

equal to zero gives us
I +., F

N
N

E(EdA)]

.

1-

[1 - E(Ed)]2

l
(BlOa)

and
Ed

N(d)

N
Nd,

l- E,

--- (-d)

3[1

I

Combining the last two equations and solving for

- dA (E d )
Nd

(B10b)

- oE(Ed)](l + E
Nd

yields

[1 + E(Ed)]EdNd

=dEd

E(Ed)[l

-

E(Ed)]

from which it follows that
dE(Ed)
-Ed dEd
1 E(Ed)

( I

(Ed)"

(Blt)

The solution to equation (B 11) is a value Ed independent of N. Since the plaintiffs
must examine every case, it never pays them to spend more than (d) on each;
so as N goes to infinity, Ep goes to some upper limit, and E(Ep) goes to some
limit greater than zero. Combining these facts with equation (Bl0a) implies that,
for sufficiently large N, Nd increases as N 2"3 . Hence,
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li EdNd
rn V
= 0

and

1

lrn (R) =

As the number of cases goes to infinity, the defense perfectly identifies overclaimed cases at a cost that is vanishing small compared to the amount at stake.
This confirms the verbal analysis earlier used to derive the plaintiffs' strategy in
the limit of large N.
THE PLAINTIFFS' STRATEGY: FINITE N

We can use our results for the defense to learn more about the plaintiffs'
strategy for finite N." The equivalent of equation (B8), seen from the plaintiffs'
side, is
Net Benefit to Plaintiffs
1_1E+

(1 +

+

N(d) - NEp .

3(l

EP)

- E(Ed)]

Here EP is the expenditure by the plaintiffs on examining each case.
The plaintiffs maximize their net benefit by choosing EP:
de(Ep)

1=- dE
dE v
[1 +

(d)
E(Ep)]
2

22VE(Ed)
X

L+

[1 - F(Ed)]

1
I + (EP)"

+ N(Ep

-/

I

-

2E(E)[1

-

E(Ep)1)1"

In the limit as N goes to infinity, this gives us back equation (B4).
SOME COMPLICATIONS

We have assumed, so far, that all cases are identical ex ante. Suppose we
instead assume that there are two sorts of cases: easy cases and hard cases. For
easy cases, the distribution of error is Ee(E); for hard cases it is Eh(E). The
condition E(E) < Eh(E) for all E holds.
The argument implying that Ri = R for all i still holds under this assumption,
but the plaintiffs' attorney no longer maximizes his clients' expected net benefit
by using the same value of E for each client and making claims Ci proportional
to d i. Instead, he applies equation (B4) separately to calculate E, Eh; C i is then
calculated from equation (B2), using Ee for the easy cases and Eh for the hard
cases.
4 This is not a full analysis since I have not redone, for finite N, the proof that the
plaintiffs spend the same amount on every case and choose claims proportional to the
estimated strength of each case.
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In my earlier verbal analysis, I asserted that the plaintiffs' attorney would find
it in his interest to make his claims proportional to his estimate of the strength
of each case. We now see that this conclusion must be qualified. If some cases
are known to be more difficult than others, meaning that it is more costly to
estimate the average verdict if they are tried, the plaintiffs' attorney has an incentive to hold down his costs by making a less accurate estimate for those cases
and making up for it by somewhat underclaiming them.
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